US army FM

• Importance of intelligence
• odd dynamic - everyone should do it but only if you are trained
• intelligence preparation of the battlefield
• intelligence operations dynamic - self reinforcing cycle
• HUMINT
• RECCI vs. HUMINT
• reconnaissance is hard HUMINT is easier
• HUMINT sources are more accessible than RECCI targets

Chapter 3

Intelligence

COIN is intelligence-driven

• both insurgency and COIN try to have upper-hand in intelligence networks
• both also try to disrupt the other network
• for COIN, socio/cultural info is important
• insurgency networks vary in their organization and learning capacity
• so all levels need to collect intelligence to gain a holistic picture of the enemy
• be able to process for their own situation

Pre-depolyment:

• intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
• IPB is defined as the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area
• it is a component of component of mission analysis, and helps determine deployment
• IPB helps to establish a plan for addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency
• it helps prepare COIN units to interact with the populace appropriately
• IPB focuses on civil situation - leaders etc. -
• IPB in COIN requires personnel to work in areas like economics, anthropology, and governance -
• the goal of IPB is to find a culturally appropriate way of gaining popular support.

THE INTELLIGENCE-OPERATIONS DYNAMIC

• Intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate additional intelligence
• it is a self reinforcing loop
• for example good operation leads to happier populace which means the people will give you more information
• inaccurate intelligence leads to operations that piss off the populace, and discourage them from giving a COIN unit information

Human intelligence (HUMINT)

• the collection of information from people and their associated documents and media sources to get intel
• must be by a trained human intelligence collector
• often info that can't be garnered from other sources - this type of info important for COIN
• interrogation is one aspect of HUMINT
• take care to protect HUMINT sources because insurgents will target them
• humint collectors know how to protect them and it should be left to them to handle the sources
• Quantity of nformation depends on COIN's ability to protect the population from insurgent intimidation
• the population has to be willing to give info they cannot be forced

Military Source operations

• developing humint sources/networks in the field
• Interrogation of detainees and debreifing of defectors -questioning must meet US law, international law, etc.

RECCI vs. HUMINT

• all operations should include intelligence gathering goals
• traditional reconnaissance (recci) is ineffective in COIN because info is social info that is easily hidden by suspicious populations
• insurgents also flexible- so if recci elements are noticed, then insurgents can leave
• HUMINT is generally better than recci

Other Options

• HUMINT is one of many intelligence disciplines.
• Others are signals intelligence (SIGINT) which is useful in COIN
• open-source intelligence, media, etc. are other sources of info useful for cultural info/understanding
• they give understanding into public attitudes and reasons for public support of insurgents
• imagery intelligence IMINT - aerial photography etc can track insurgent movements, find insurgent activity areas
• the list goes on.. there are lots of intelligence disciplines that are of some use to COIN)

Counterintelligence

• counters or neutralizes intelligence collection effort
• Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies
• COIN units must be careful who they work with sharing intelligence can provide sources of information to insurgents
• insurgents can do recci easily by blending into populace
• insurgents also have early warning system of civilians - warn of attacks

Conclusion

• Intel Analysis in COIN is hard b.c - culture different, insurgents change,
• much of population is important/should be tracked
• analysts need to be pushed down in the organization - decentralized

Comprehensive Insurgency Analysis

• examines interactions among individuals, groups, and beliefs within the operational environment’s historic and cultural context.
• One of the more important products of this analysis is an understanding of how local people think

trying to understand insurgent…

• support base,
• links to population,
• organizational structure and leadership
• insurgency as a social phenomenon,
• root causes,
• how insurgency manifests itself,
• how it is an outgrowth of the social environment in which it exists
• perceptions

• this is time consuming and difficult, but key to success.